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Abstract 
This paper models the impact of the diffusion of computers on the wage structure, starting from the 
observation that computer use increases individual productivity, but also the supply of goods. This 
latter effect negatively affects workers producing similar goods. If the productivity gain is 
proportional, and the costs of a computer are equal for everyone, workers with high wages are the first 
to adopt, leading to within-group wage inequality. Distinguishing skilled and unskilled workers we 
show that between-group wage inequality falls when the first skilled workers adopt computers. When 
unskilled workers start to use computers, between group wage inequality increases strongly because 
of the increased supply of unskilled labor in terms of efficiency units. The maximum level of wage 
inequality depends mainly on parameters regarding the distribution of the productivity of workers 
within and between groups: A large initial level of wage inequality leads to a large short term relative 
increase in wage inequality. In the long run, when all workers have adopted computers, both within-
group and between-group wage inequality fall to a level depending on differences in productivity 
gains from using computers. Empirically it is shown that the model is consistent with the pattern of 
wage inequality in the United States in the period 1963-2000. The current pattern is mainly 
determined by the short term determinants of wage inequality, making the long run implications 
difficult to identify and predict. 
 
Keywords: Wage Inequality; Wage Level and Structure; Computerization 
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 Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) argue that the mid-1970s are the watershed in the acceleration of wage1
inequality because the price of computer equipment fell faster after 1974 than before, which fosters adoption.
Katz (2000) argues that wage inequality began to rise in the early 1980s, just after the invention of
microcomputers. See also Katz and Murphy (1992), Bound and Johnson (1992), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
(1993), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull and Violante (2000); and Johnson (1997),
Katz and Autor (1999), Acemoglu (2002), Aghion (2002), and Card and DiNardo (2002) for overviews and
criticism.
 See for example Krueger (1993) for the seminal paper suggesting that computer users earn higher wages2
because of skill advantages, explaining about one half of the widening of the educational wage structure in the
period 1984-1989. Levy and Murnane (1996) and Autor, Levy and Murnane (2002) argue that the introduction
of computers in a large U.S. bank has induced substitution of unskilled for skilled workers. Berman, Bound and
Griliches (1994), Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Allen (2001), and
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) observe that higher levels of computerization and investments in
computer equipment are associated with higher levels of skill and education in the workforce.
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1. Introduction
It has been well documented that wage inequality in the United States has accelerated upon
the emergence of computers in the labor market.  Several studies have suggested that the1
increase in wage inequality since the early 1980s has been caused by a complementary
relationship between computers and skilled labor. Indeed, computer use is more concentrated
among skilled workers and associated with higher earnings.  However, already in the early2
1970s a non-negligible part of the workforce had access to mainframe computers, which did
not lead to wage inequality at that time (Bresnahan, 1999). In addition, wage inequality
decreased until the early 1980s and although the diffusion of computers is still far from
complete, the increase in wage inequality seems to be leveling off in the 1990s (Card and
DiNardo, 2002).
In this paper we propose a model which is able to explain these observations. We do
so by explicitly taking into account the diffusion process of computers, starting from the
simple observation that computerization increases individual productivity but also the supply
of goods. Computer use by a particular group of workers therefore negatively affects workers
in the same group not using a computer but producing a similar good. The model contains
three main features. First, the diffusion of computers is based on cost-benefit considerations
-2-
weighing the productivity benefits against the costs of computer use, which induces adoption
among high-wage workers first. Secondly, by distinguishing two groups of workers (skilled
and unskilled), each producing one similar good, but with productivity differences between
workers, we derive analytical results for wage developments both within and between
different groups of workers. Thirdly, we explicitly model the assignment of computers to
workers. Due to productivity differences not all workers adopt at the same time and limited
substitution between skilled and unskilled workers leads to different effects on wages within
and between groups.
The main results of the paper are the following. The pattern and structure of wages
over time predicted by the model show different effects for between-group and within-group
wage inequality. Between-group wage inequality is falling when the first skilled workers
adopt computers because the additional supply in efficiency units depresses average skilled
wages more than the productivity gains increase wages. When more skilled workers adopt
computers, and when unskilled workers start to use computers, between-group wage
inequality will increase strongly because the productivity gains skilled workers experience
outweigh the additional supply of skilled labor in efficiency units. More importantly, the
supply of additional efficiency units of unskilled workers increases between-group wage
inequality. When all workers have adopted computers, wage inequality falls to a level
depending on differences in productivity gains between skilled and unskilled workers. When
skilled (unskilled) workers benefit more, between-group wage inequality will be permanently
higher (lower). However, the short term effects on between-group wage inequality are much
higher than the long term effects. We also show that the maximum level of between-group
wage inequality is higher the higher the level initial wage inequality.
Within-group wage inequality for skilled (unskilled) workers is increasing once the
 See Geroski (2000) for an overview of the technology diffusion literature.3
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first skilled (unskilled) workers have adopted computers. This is the case because all workers
in a group suffer in terms of wages from the additional supply of efficiency units, but only the
adopters benefit from the productivity gain from using a computer. If all workers within a
group have adopted computers, within-group wage inequality in that group falls to the level
prior to computer adoption if the productivity gains for every worker within the same group
are the same.
Empirically, we show that the pattern of wage inequality predicted by the model is
consistent with the pattern and timing of wage inequality in the United States in the period
1963-2000. Using CPS data, we find the productivity gains from using computers to be
between 15 and 40 percent, both for skilled and unskilled workers. This is consistent with
estimates of the costs of computers relative to annual wages. Because currently not all workers
have adopted computers, the short term effects of computer adoption are dominating the
structural long term productivity effects. Based on past and current developments in the wage
structure, it is therefore hard to precisely point out whether skilled or unskilled workers
benefit most in terms of productivity gains. As a result, the current developments do not
provide conclusive information about the long run implications for wage inequality.
The model is related to the older literature on the diffusion of new technologies,
including the work of Griliches (1957), Mansfield (1961), David (1969), Stoneman (1976),
and Davies (1979), who argue that the costs of new technologies are important determinants
of adoption and diffusion.  In this paper, (endogenous) wages and productivity gains3
determine whether computer adoption is beneficial, whereas previous models treated the
determinants of the diffusion process mostly exogenously. The model is also related to more
recent studies on technology adoption by Chari and Hopenhayen (1991), Galor and Tsiddon
 The models predicting the adoption and diffusion of general purpose technologies are also consistent with our4
approach because computer use is pervasive in a wide range of sectors in ways that change their modes of
production (e.g., Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995 and Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998).
 Caroli and García-Peñalosa (2002) also present a model accounting for both between-group and within-group5
wage inequality using differences in wage-setting behavior and wage instability in different stages of
technological development. Their model is driven by the assumption that changes in workers’ risk aversion
induce changes in wages.
-4-
(1997), Caselli (1999), and Weinberg (2001).  In these papers, skilled workers have a higher4
probability to work with new technologies than unskilled workers because new technologies
can be more productively operated by skilled workers, but they do not take into account the
costs of new technologies. Violante (2002) assumes noncompetitive labor markets to explain
wage inequality among ex ante equal workers in relation to the adoption of new technologies.
The heterogeneity among workers is not generated by skill differentials but by technological
differentials across the machines of different vintages they are matched with. We are able to
distinguish between the timing of technology adoption and the productivity gain resulting
from adoption in a competitive labor market. By distinguishing productivity differentials
within the groups of skilled and unskilled workers, we also differ from the above theories, and
the ones developed by Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Acemoglu (1998), and Kiley
(1999), by explaining both between-group and within-group wage inequality, whereas the
other studies mentioned above only analyze wage inequality either within or between groups.5
Finally, with regard to the distribution of productivity within the groups of skilled and
unskilled workers, this paper is related to the approaches of Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1998), Galor and Moav (2000), Gould, Moav and Weinberg (2001), and Aghion, Howitt and
Violante (2002). They also use some (ability) distribution to examine within-group inequality,
which leads to the development and transferability of technology-specific skills driving wage
inequality, whereas our mechanism of within-group inequality is determined by the costs of
computers relative to the wages and the productivity gains from using computers. Finally, the
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pattern of wage inequality resulting from the diffusion of computers presented in this paper is
not necessarily caused by a pervasive skill-biased nature of computers, but driven by the
adoption of computers at different points in time.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the patterns of wage inequality
in the United States. Section 3 presents the basic model. Section 4 shows the predicted pattern
of wage inequality over time. Section 5 presents estimates of the model for wage inequality in
the United States in the period 1963-2000. Section 6 concludes.
2. Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure, 1963-2000
If computer adoption increases productivity, two factors influencing the wage structure have
to be distinguished. First, there will be an individual productivity increase for workers
adopting computers. Secondly, increased productivity also increases the supply of goods
produced. This latter factor might influence the wages of all workers, depending on how
substitutable the goods they produce are. Hence, besides an individual effect, related to
productivity, changes in the wage structure depend on the composition of groups of workers
producing substitutable goods. We define wage differences between workers with different
productivity levels producing similar goods as within-group wage inequality and define wage
differences between workers in different product market groups as between-group wage
inequality.
Since it is difficult to determine exactly the groups of workers producing similar
goods, we assume that the main distinction in the goods market can be made between physical
and cognitive goods and services. We assume that physical goods are produced by unskilled
workers, while cognitive goods are produced by skilled workers. Skilled workers are defined
as those with a college degree or more, and unskilled workers as the ones with a level of
 See Appendices A.1-A.5 for details concerning the data.6
 We are grateful to Kevin Murphy for his suggestion to perform this analysis.7
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education below a college degree. Workers are assumed to be fully substitutable within these
two groups, and substitutable in a limited way or complementary between groups.
Figure 1 shows three pictures of relative annual wages in the United States in the
period 1963-2000 using the March CPS files.  Each picture provides annual wages relative to6
the annual wages of the workers at the 10  percentile of the unskilled wage distribution.th
Comparison of Panel A and B reveals information about the pattern of within-group wage
inequality for skilled workers. The figures reveal that within-group wage inequality for skilled
workers is increasing throughout the whole period but that the behavior of the top and bottom
percentiles is rather different. Panel C shows within-group wage inequality for unskilled
workers. This picture shows a rather modest increase until 1980 and an acceleration
afterwards. To examine between-group wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers, Panel A and B have to be compared with Panel C of Figure 1. This comparison
yields that the wages of the top earners among the skilled workers are steadily increasing over
time, but that the wages of the bottom earners among the skilled workers are first falling and
then rising again.
INSERT FIGURE 1 OVER HERE
To show the crucial distinction between the development of between-group and
within-group wage inequality, we compare workers from both groups earning the same wages
in 1963.  We have taken the annual wages of the skilled workers at the 40  and 50  percentile7 th th
and looked for the unskilled workers earning the same annual wages. It turns out that these are
the wages of the unskilled workers at the 75.7  and 83.9  percentile of the unskilled wageth th
 These percentiles of the wage distribution of both groups are taken because at these percentiles there exists a8
great deal of overlap between the wages of both groups of workers. The percentiles do not exactly match
because not all possible values of wages are present in the sample. Actually the 75.7  and 83.9  percentile of theth th
unskilled wage distribution are somewhat above the 40  and 50  percentile of the skilled wage distribution.th th
 This pattern of between-group wage inequality is consistent with the figures presented by Katz and Murphy9
(1992) using similar data for the period 1963-1987, and the analysis of Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull and Violante
(2000) for the period 1963-1992.
 Such arguments have also been put forward by Card and DiNardo (2002). They argue that the effects of10
computer adoption on the wage structure need to be different for different groups of workers at different points
in time to be able to connect the structure of wages over the last 50 years to computerization.
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distribution.  Figure 2 shows the wage differentials between both groups keeping the relative8
position within each group constant at these percentiles. The picture reveals that wage
differentials rise somewhat and are positive until the early 1970s. From then on until the mid-
1980s the wages for unskilled workers are higher. Around 1980 there is a turning point in the
wage differential in favor of skilled workers. Figure 2 reveals that workers with the same
productivity in 1963, but who differ with respect to the group they belong to, have
experienced a different pattern of wages over time.9
INSERT FIGURE 2 OVER HERE
3. Basic Model
Analyzing these simple pictures suggests that wages are both determined by individual
productivity levels within each group of workers and by differences between the two groups
of workers. These two effects have a different impact on the wage structure over time and
need to be analyzed separately.  To do so, consider a competitive economy producing a10
homogeneous good Y. The good is produced by a labor input consisting of skilled and
unskilled workers. Because of productivity differences among skilled and unskilled workers,
we define the supply in terms of efficiency units as S and U.
Y 
 ((χS)ρ  (ψU)ρ)1/ρ,
w eus w
eu
u
w eu  w
eu
s
w euu

 ψUχS
1/σ
.
w euu w
eu
s 
 (χS/ψU)1	ρ.
ai  [α,α] α > α
bj  [β,β] β > β
 Gould, Moav and Weinberg (2001), Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002), and Violante (2002) also explain11
differences in the development of within-group and between-group wage inequality in the United States. They
assume workers to differ in their adaptability to new technologies as a result of random shocks or assignment,
and Violante (2002) also assumes that technologies differ in their productivity or quality to generate temporary
within-group wage inequality. Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002) use an overlapping generations model to get
similar effects of technology adoption on wages. Caroli and García-Peñalosa (2002) build a model in which they
use different attitudes towards risk to generate heterogeneity between workers.
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Production
Production occurs according to a CES production function and equals
(1)
where ρ1, and the elasticity of substitution between S and U equals σ=1/(1-ρ). The
corresponding wages in efficiency units are  and  for S and U, and competitive
wages give a standard relative demand equation:
(2)
For convenience,  is normalized to 1, so
Heterogeneity among Workers
Productivity levels differ not only between groups, but also within both groups. This might be
due to unobserved heterogeneity, but individual productivity levels might also differ from year
to year due to on-the-job learning, aging, sector shifts and other influences, which need not be
specified further. We assume that workers are perfectly substitutable within both groups, so
any productivity difference is reflected in wages.11
Productivity depends on the parameters with for skilled worker
i and with for unskilled worker j. Productivity parameters of skilled
and unskilled workers can only be compared when wages in efficiency units are taken into
account. We allow the wage intervals of both groups to overlap. This is consistent with the
empirical observation that the wages of the most productive unskilled workers are higher than
βw euu > αw eus
P s(a) 
 1
1	ρ a
2ρ	1
1	ρ p s P u(b) 
 1
1	ρ b
2ρ	1
1	ρ p u p s 
 σ	1σ
1
ασ	1	ασ	1
p u 
 σ	1σ
1
βσ	1	βσ	1
q si 
 ai q
u
j 
 bj
q si 
 aiθs q uj 
 bjθu
 For the production function used here, a different elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled12
workers could lead to a slightly different distribution of the productivity parameters.
 The alternative assumption would be a complementary relationship between the productivity parameters a and13
b and θ. Assuming such a relationship leads to earlier adoption of computers (given the costs of adoption) for
workers with a proportional productivity gain θ>θ  and θ>θ  and to a later adoption for workers experiencingi s j u
proportional productivity gains smaller than θ  and θ . As will be shown below, such an assumption would leads u
to a similar pattern of diffusion but to a permanently higher level of within-group wage inequality.
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the wages of the least productive unskilled worker, i.e. . To make this overlap
of productivity levels consistent with rational individual schooling decisions, it has to be
assumed that productivity does not only depend on years of schooling. Differences in innate
ability, talent for either physical or cognitive tasks, or age and experience all provide plausible
arguments for this assumption.
To enable an analytical solution of the model, the distribution of the productivity
parameters for skilled and unskilled workers is assumed to take the following
form: and , where  and
 are obtained from solving the integral for the distributions of productivity
parameters of both types of workers. If σ=2, the assumed distribution is such that the wage bill
is uniformly distributed over the productivity parameters a and b.12
Productivity
Each worker’s productivity level depends on his productivity parameter and whether or not he
uses a computer. Productivity equals  and  without using a computer
and  and when using a computer, where θ , θ >1 is the proportionals u
productivity gain from working with a computer. We assume that within both groups the
productivity gain from using a computer is the same, while between both groups it is allowed
to differ, and for all workers there exists some computer application, which makes production
more efficient.  These assumptions are justified because within each group, workers are13
w si 
ai w
eu
s w
u
j 
bj
w si 
ai w
eu
s θs	V w uj 
bjθu	V
w euu .
a bei 

V
(θs	1)w eus
b bej 

V
(θu	1)
.
 Note that the adoption decision may be different for each individual worker within a firm. This is consistent14
with the literature investigating inter- and intra-firm technology diffusion showing that the diffusion of new
technology within firms is similar to the diffusion between firms (e.g., Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993 and
Stoneman and Kwon, 1996). Hence, it is unlikely that firms adopt computers for all workers at once.
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producing the same product.
Wages
In a competitive labor market, each efficiency unit of labor receives the same return and the
individual wage equals the productivity parameter multiplied by the return to an efficiency
unit of labor. In such a setting, employers are indifferent between employing a worker who
uses a computer and one who does not because they pay the same wage for each efficiency
unit of labor. This means that both the productivity gain and the costs of the computer are
passed on to worker. Hence, wages equal  and  for a worker who does
not use a computer and and for one who does, where V
represents the cost of the computer. Note that V is (implicitly) expressed in terms of
Wages and Computer Adoption
The decision to adopt a computer can be written as a trade-off between the increased
productivity θ and the costs of the computer V, given the worker’s productivity.  The break-14
even productivity for computer adoption for both types of workers then equals
(3a)
and
(3b)
Equations (3) show that the break-even productivity at which it becomes beneficial to adopt a
computer falls when (i) the costs of the computer fall, (ii) the productivity gain becomes
θs	1 > θu	1,
S 
 S e α
α
ai P
s daiS e α
a bei
(θs	1)ai P sdai U 
 U e ββbj P u dbiU e βb bej (θu	1)bj P udbj ,
S 
 S e p s (ασ	ασ) (θs	1) ασ	 V
(θs	1)w eus
σ
 The development of computers might also be endogenized by directing a certain fraction of production15
towards the development of computers. The allocation of labor to R&D then leads to falling costs and higher
quality. However, endogenizing the development of computers does not yield additional insight in explaining
wage inequality. David and Olsen (1986) develop such a diffusion model in which the development of new
technology is endogenized. Earlier attempts to endogenize the development of new technologies can be found in
e.g., Griliches (1957, 1958), and Mansfield (1961, 1965).
 If, all things being equal, skilled workers gain more in terms of productivity from using a16
computer, which is equivalent to arguing that they are more efficient in using the computer. Chennells and Van
Reenen (1997), Entorf and Kramarz (1997), and Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz (1999) interpret their findings for
the United Kingdom and France of high-wage workers using a computer as results in favor of such an
explanation.
-11-
larger, and (iii) the wage per efficiency unit of labor is higher. Assuming that the costs of the
computer are the same for each worker and fall exogenously and continuously over time, the
productivity gain and the wage in terms of efficiency units determine the adoption of the
computer.  Hence, computer costs relative to wages determine whether or not it is beneficial15
for a worker to adopt a computer while differences in computer use between skilled and
unskilled workers also depend on differences in the proportional productivity gains from using
a computer.16
Supply of Efficiency Units
The supply of efficiency units of labor consists of two components: (i) the sum of all
productivity parameters representing total productivity before computerization, and (ii) the
productivity gains workers experience from using a computer, which equals
 and 
where S  and U  are defined as the supply of skilled and unskilled workers in persons.e e
Solving these equations results in the following two expressions for the supply of
efficiency units of labor:
(4a)
and
U 
 U e p u (βσ	βσ) (θu	1) βσ	 V
(θu	1)
σ
.
w¯s
w¯u

 θ
s
θu
ρ w¯ 0s
w¯ 0u
.
 See e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992) and Johnson (1997) for U.S. estimates, Angrist (1995) for estimates for17
Israel, and Hamermesh (1993) for an overview.
 An instance at which ρ<0, often pointed at, is the complementarity between the manager and the secretary. If18
θ <θ  the secretary benefits more from computer use than the manager. This means that, given the amount ofs u
work, the demand for secretaries will fall.
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(4b)
Equations (4) show that the supply of efficiency units of labor depends positively on the size
of the distribution of the productivity parameters a and b, the productivity gain from using a
computer θ, and the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers σ, and
negatively on the costs of the computer V.
Relative Wages after Complete Diffusion with No Computer Costs
To solve the equilibrium relative wages in efficiency units, equations (4) are substituted into
the relative demand equation (2). 
Before turning to the equilibrium wages, consider relative wages after the complete
diffusion of computers and V=0: 
(5)
Equation (5) shows that relative wages after diffusion have changed with a factor (θ /θ ) .s u ρ
Wage inequality will be higher if θ <θ  and skilled and unskilled workers are complementss u
(ρ<0) and if θ >θ  and skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes (ρ>0). While the empiricals u
literature seems to point at ρ>0,  the model leaves open both alternatives.17 18
Computer costs
Of course, the costs of using a computer are not negligible relative to the wage. The costs of
 Full-time equivalent employees equal the number of employees on full-time schedules plus the number of19
employees on part-time schedules converted to a full-time basis. The number of full-time equivalent employees
in each industry is the product of the total number of employees and the ratio of average weekly hours per
employee for all employees to the average weekly hours per employee on full-time schedules. 
 Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) report computer investments per full time equivalent worker to be $2,545 in20
1990, which is equivalent to about $5,000 per full time equivalent computer user. Figures for 1960, 1970 and
1980 yield comparable investments per full-time equivalent computer user. Computer use is taken from the
October 1997 School Enrollment Supplements to the CPS. There is likely to be measurement error in the NIPA
data because the Bureau of Economic Analysis does often not directly measure information processing
equipment and software at high frequency, but imputes these data. See Gorman, Musgrave, Silverstein and
Comins (1985), Berndt and Morrison (1995), and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) for a discussion. See also
Allen (2001) for a more detailed treatment of computer investments and investments in science and technology
related to the wage structure in the United States.
 These occupations are “Computer systems analysts and scientists” (CPS Occupational Classification Code for21
Detailed Occupational Categories 064), “Operations and systems researchers and analysts” (065), “Computer
science teachers” (129), “Computer programmers” (229), “Tool programmers, numerical control” (233),
“Computer operators” (308), “Peripheral equipment operators” (309), “Data-entry keyers” (385), “Data
processing equipment repairers” (525), and “Office machine repairers” (538).
 Sectors of industry with more than 10 percent computer related employment are “Computer and data22
processing services” (CPS Industry Classification Code for Detailed Industry 732), “Telegraph and
miscellaneous communications services” (442), “Not specified utilities” (472), “Computers and related
-13-
the computer should be interpreted as the costs of the entire deal, i.e. hardware, software,
networks, and technical assistance. In dollar terms, a back-of-the-envelope calculation
estimates the annual costs of using a computer to be $6,567 in 1997, which accounts for about
21 percent of the average worker’s real annual wage in the United States. This figure is
computed as follows.
First, using the “investment in information processing equipment and software” data
collected by NIPA and dividing this number by the computer using workforce in full-time
equivalents  yields computer costs of $4,530.  Secondly, regressing the relative number of19 20
workers in computer related jobs (cw)  to computer users (c) per sector of industry, using the21
October 1997 School Enrollment Supplements to the CPS, and weighing by industry size,
yields (standard errors in brackets) cw = 1.38 (.003) + .063 (.005) c. To obtain a conservative
estimate for the cost of technical assistance, we left out the sectors of industry with relatively
high fractions of computer related job.  Since the average monthly wages of workers in22
equipment” (322), “Electrical repair shops” (752), “Professional and commercial equipment and supplies”
(510), and “Radio, TV, and computer stores” (633).
 These numbers and calculations are based on NIPA figures and consistent with the number and calculations23
presented by Jorgenson (2001).
-14-
computer related jobs equals $2,692, we estimate the costs of assistance for each individual
worker to be equal to $2,037. 
It has been well documented that the price of computer equipment has been falling
extremely rapidly over time, which induced diffusion (e.g., Jorgenson and Stiroh, 1999 and
Jorgenson, 2001). Figures collected by NIPA suggest that investments in computer equipment
are only some 20-25 percent of total investments in information processing equipment and
software over the 1990s. Investments in software account for some 30-40 percent, while other
investments make up some 35-50 percent of total investments. The quality-adjusted prices of
software (e.g., Jorgenson, 2001, Figure 2), and other computer related investments have
hardly been falling over time. The overall annual decline in the costs of information
processing equipment and software has been 2.1 percent over the period 1959-2001.  These23
figures suggest that the adoption rate of computers at work is likely to be slower than the rate
of fall in the price of computer equipment, and that the costs of computers are non-negligible
relative to the workers’ wages.
Differences in the quality of computers used by different workers are not explicitly
considered in the model. When considering different vintages of computers in a perfectly
competitive market, the most productive workers would be assigned to the most recent
vintage. In addition, the costs of the computer might also be different for different workers.
For example, large firms might have an advantage in maintenance and technical assistance,
which leads to lower computer costs per worker. Next to that, some workers need a less
expensive computer than others, which induces earlier adoption, all other things equal.
β α
[α,α] [β,β]
 This assumption is consistent with the figures on computer use for 1984, 1989, and 1993 presented by Autor,24
Katz and Krueger (1998). They show that computer use is higher for more educated workers but it is rising
among all different educational groups.
 Note that it is possible that certain stages of diffusion will never become effective because of the overlapping25
productivity parameters between skilled and unskilled workers. For example, given wages, proportional
productivity gains and the distribution of productivity parameters, an unskilled worker with productivity
could reach the break-even point for computer use later than a skilled worker with productivity , which
would induce computer use among unskilled workers when all skilled workers already have one. Therefore, in
theory, the order of the stages could be different.
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Finally, some workers perform tasks on the basis of ready-made applications, whereas for
others with higher wages and higher productivity gains no application is available yet.
However, for simplicity, we make the assumption that the costs of the computer are given to
the worker and are equal for all workers.
Equilibrium Relative Wages in Efficiency Units
With an exogenously falling price of computers, the benefits of adopting a computer are
changing over time for all workers. Since the productivity levels of both skilled and unskilled
workers is concentrated on the intervals parameters and , different stages in
the adoption process will occur. The order of these stages depends on both the level of wages
and break-even wages of skilled and unskilled workers. Since a diffusion pattern in which the
most productive skilled workers are the first to adopt  followed by the most productive
unskilled workers, the least productive skilled workers, and finally the least productive
unskilled workers  seems to be consistent with the actual patterns of adoption, our analyses
focus on this sequence of adoption.24
Equilibrium wages in efficiency units are computed in each of the five stages in the
diffusion process:  (i) no computer use, (ii) the high-wage skilled workers adopt computers,25
(iii) both types of workers adopt computers, (iv) all skilled and a fraction of the unskilled
workers adopt computers, and (v) all workers use computers. Table 1 shows the relative
βα, a1, β, α, β
α, β, a2, α, β
 The equilibrium wages for other skilled workers with different productivity parameters follow26
straightforwardly from the results presented in Table 2. In addition, the derivation of the wages for unskilled
workers is similar to the derivation of the equilibrium wages shown here.
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wages in efficiency units in each of the five stages. When there is no computer use, relative
wages depend on the supply of efficiency units, the distribution of productivity parameters and
the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor. In the other four stages,
relative wages in efficiency units also depend on θ, V, and the additional units of supply of
efficiency units. Note that relative wages in efficiency units do not change anymore once every
worker has adopted a computer, even when V>0. This is because the supply of the number of
efficiency units of labor, once all workers have adopted a computer, remains constant and is
independent of V, e.g. equations (4).
INSERT TABLE 1 OVER HERE
Table 2 shows individual wages for two workers with productivity parameters a  and1
a  relative to worker j with productivity . The level of the wages in efficiency units and the2
size of the proportional productivity gain are assumed in such a way that the adoption of
computers is assumed to take place in the following order:  and
. From Table 2 it becomes clear that the wages of all workers are influenced
once the first worker adopts a computer. In addition, once every workers has adopted a
computer, it is not until V=0 that wages do not change any more (stage 6).26
INSERT TABLE 2 OVER HERE
4. Pattern of Relative Wages over Time
Within-Group Wage Inequality
The individual wages in Table 2 can be used to analyze the properties of within-group wage
inequality over time. Figure 3 provides the wage pattern that results from the model for skilled
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 If θ is high relative to V, adoption of the whole group will occur at earlier stages. It will also lead to a higher27
maximum level of within-group wage inequality because  if θ >θ . Thes1 s2
maximum level of wage inequality will be experienced earlier because the least productive worker will reach the
break-even point of adoption earlier on. On the other hand, V becomes negligible relative to the wage costs
earlier on, which leads to a faster drop in within-group wage inequality. If V falls faster over time, the adoption
of computers and the effects on the wage structure will occur faster and earlier on. The maximum level of
within-group wage inequality will remain the same because this only depends on  and θ .s
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(Panel A) and unskilled (Panel B) workers. Since no worker has adopted a computer yet, in
the first stage of the model all wage differentials remain the same. The wage structure starts to
change when V is sufficiently low for the most productive skilled workers to adopt a
computer. In this second stage (which lasts until the most productive unskilled worker adopts
a computer), the wages of skilled workers change when skilled worker l adopts a computer
( ) according to
(6a)
for skilled workers k who already adopted a computer ( ), and according to
(6b)
for skilled workers m who did not yet adopt ( ).
From equations (6) a number of model features become apparent. First, once it
becomes beneficial for worker l to adopt a computer his wage increases relative to the wage of
worker m leading to wage inequality within the group of skilled workers because
.  The wages for the non-adopters change, but only proportionally, and27
there is no increase in wage inequality between non-adopters. Since the term  is larger for
lower values of  there is wage convergence within the group of computer users, leading to
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 The pattern and length of time of within-group wage inequality also depend on the productivity differential28
, the costs of the computer relative to the productivity gain, and the speed at which V is falling over time.
The maximum level of within-group wage inequality only depends on  and θ . When the initials
productivity differential is smaller, or the productivity gain relative to the computer cost is higher, or V is falling
more rapidly over time, the length of time of increasing and overall within-group wage inequality is shorter. A
higher productivity differentials and a higher proportional productivity gain will induce a higher maximum
absolute level of within-group wage inequality.
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less wage inequality among computer users in the same group.
Secondly, it is not necessarily the case that the wages of computer adopters rise
immediately after adoption. Wages fall, relative to worker j with productivity , for the
first adopter  because . However, the wages for the workers not
adopting a computer fall by more because , so it is rational to
adopt a computer at the break-even point (e.g., equations (3)). In this stage of the diffusion
process, wages rise immediately after adoption only if equation (6a) is positive. This situation
might never occur in this stage but is more likely to occur if is relatively large.  28
If  wages for worker l rise immediately after adoption. Note
that, because , the wages for worker k are still falling, relative to , at this point
in time. Wages of computer users and non-users are still diverging, but at a lower pace,
because when skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes (σ1) decreases when
decreases. 
In the third stage, when unskilled workers start to adopt computers ( ),
the wage development of skilled workers when worker l adopts a computer ( )
can be described by
(7a)
for skilled workers k who already adopted a computer ( ), and by
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(7b)
for skilled workers m who did not yet adopt ( ).
If skilled and unskilled labor are substitutes, both the skilled computer users and the
skilled non-users benefit from the increased productivity among unskilled workers, reflected
in additional term in equations (7) when compared to equations (6). Due to the increased
productivity of skilled computer users, these workers gain more in relative terms than the
skilled non-users. Computer use among unskilled workers therefore stimulate the increasing
within-group wage inequality among skilled workers. Note that the development of relative
wages of two computer users or of two non-users are not affected by computer adoption
among unskilled workers.
In the fourth stage, all skilled workers have adopted the computer. Until adoption is
completed among unskilled workers (stage 5), the wage developments for skilled workers are
described by
(8)
From equation (8) it follows that if all skilled workers have adopted a computer, but not all
unskilled workers have adopted one yet, there will be wage convergence within the group of
skilled workers because .
If all workers have adopted computers, , so it follows straightforwardly
that wage inequality within the group of skilled workers behaves similarly to the previous
situation. Finally, if V=0, wage inequality within the group of skilled workers is back at its
α β
0wai
0	V 
0 α>ai
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level prior to computerization.
INSERT FIGURE 3 OVER HERE
A similar pattern of wage inequality within the group of unskilled workers can be
obtained. The only difference is that the timing of the different stages of adoption is different.
Essentially, the wage structure within both groups is characterized by only three phases: (i) no
computer use, (ii) some computer use, and (iii) every workers uses a computer. Only when
unskilled workers start to adopt computers, the adoption process of skilled workers, and
therefore within-group wage inequality accelerates because of the increase in skilled workers’
efficiency wages. Such increasing wages are equivalent to faster decreasing computer prices,
since the wage/computer price ratio determines the adoption process.
Between-Group Wage Inequality
Defining the wage ratio of the workers with productivity  and  as between-group
wage inequality, it follows from equations (6) that this ratio is falling when the first skilled
worker adopts a computer, leading to a lower level of between-group wage inequality.
Between-group wage inequality continues to fall until , where  or until the
first unskilled worker adopts a computer. Between-group wage inequality then increases
because of two effects. The first effect results from benefits of the falling costs of computer
use for skilled workers, and the second effect results from the increasing supply of efficiency
units of unskilled labor after computer adoption, which depresses the unskilled wages in
efficiency units. Note that these effects do not depend on differences between θ  and θ . s u
The development of between-group wage inequality in each stage of computer
adoption and diffusion is displayed in Figure 4. The figure reveals that between-group wage
inequality is not likely to increase after the first workers have adopted computers. Only when
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a non-negligible group of skilled workers or the first unskilled workers adopt computers,
between-group wage inequality starts to rise. This is consistent with Bresnahan’s (1999)
concern about many workers already using computers without any substantial rise in wage
inequality as a result of computer adoption in the 1970s. The figure also shows that the pattern
of between-group wage inequality is leveling off at the end of stage 3 and again at the end of
stage 4. At the end of stage 3 almost all skilled workers have adopted computers, which seems
to be the case in the late 1990s. And at the end of stage 4 all workers have adopted computers.
The leveling off of between-group wage inequality in the mid-1990s, pointed at by Card and
DiNardo (2002) is therefore consistent with our model. Final wage inequality (when V=0) is
described by equation (5).
Between-group wage inequality reaches its maximum level at the point where the least
productive unskilled worker is just about to adopt a computer. At that point, the wage of the
worker with productivity  equals
(9)
compared to
(10)
before computerization. The ratio of these two wages equals
(11)
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Equation (11) has a number of interesting properties. First, the ratio of wages is increasing in
 meaning that a higher level of initial wage inequality between the most and least
productive worker leads to a higher peak in between-group wage inequality. Secondly, it is
also increasing in θ  for ρ>0, which means that a higher productivity gain for skilled workerss
leads to a higher maximum level of between-group wage inequality. Thirdly, the derivative of
equation (11) with respect to θ  equals , which is increasing in θ  if  isu u
small or if θ /θ  is large. Finally, if equation (11) equals . Now, the effect ofs u
an increase in θ  is larger if σ>2 and  increases this effect.s
After the least productive worker has adopted a computer, between-group wage
inequality falls because . Finally, if V=0, between-group wage inequality is
back at is level prior to computerization. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 OVER HERE
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. Data and Construction of Variables
We use the March Demographic Supplements to the CPS from 1964 to 2001 for information
about the standard labor market variables and to construct labor supply in the period 1963-
2000. The October School Enrollment Supplements to the CPS from 1984, 1989, 1993, and
1997 are used for information about computer use at work. The Appendix provides a detailed
overview of the construction of labor supply, annual wages, and computer use in the period
1963-2000 using these data.
Important data that is missing from the CPS is systematic information on computer
use. Computer use is only available in four years (1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997) and has been
imputed consistent with the break-even wage approach of the model, using the figures from
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the March and October CPS files (see Appendix A.4 and A.5 for more details). The imputed
fractions of skilled and unskilled workers using computers are displayed in Figure 5. The
pattern of diffusion shows a S-shaped diffusion pattern, which is consistent with other
evidence on the diffusion of new technologies (e.g., David, 1969 for an overview). From
Figure 5 it can be read that computer use for skilled workers has risen rather rapidly since the
early 1970s and that computer use for unskilled workers started to increase around 1980. 
While this imputation is far from ideal, it suggests that IT-related technological change
has been going on since at least the early 1970s and has continued throughout later decades.
This is consistent with several figures brought together by Card and DiNardo (2002, Section
II.A) on the diffusion of IT at the workplace and Bresnahan’s inference that a non-negligible
fraction of U.S. workers were employed in firms with computer access from the early 1970s
onwards (Bresnahan, 1999). 
INSERT FIGURE 5 OVER HERE
5.2. Econometric Specification of the Model
To estimate between-group wage inequality we estimate the log of labor demand equation (2),
allowing for a time trend. To do so, the supply and wages in terms of efficiency units of both
types of labor have to be determined. This yields the following equation for estimating
between-group wage inequality:
(12)
where  and F  and F  are the wage-bill shares of the computeru s
users within both groups. This equation has been estimated by non-linear least squares with θ ,s
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θ , γ , and γ  as the unknown parameters. The derivation of the equations for estimation isu 0 1
given in Appendix A.6.
Note that if not all subgroups of skilled workers are equally substitutable with
unskilled workers and vice versa, the estimate for between-group wage inequality will
underestimate the productivity gains from computer use, because the productivity gains will
not have affected the other group as would have been the case if we obtained the perfect
division of the labor force into groups of skilled and unskilled workers. Since our division of
skilled and unskilled workers into two groups manufacturing different goods might not be the
best split of the sample, we expect the estimate to be relatively low compared to the within-
group estimate of the proportional productivity gain from computer use.
For within-group wage inequality the following two equations have been estimated:
(13a)
for skilled workers, and 
(13b)
for unskilled workers. These equations have also been estimated by non-linear least squares
with θ , θ , and γ  as the unknown parameters. Again, the derivation of these equations iss u 0
shown in Appendix A.6.
Note that if there is heterogeneity in the quality of the computer equipment, the
estimate for within-group wage inequality is likely overestimate the average productivity gains
from computer use because it measures the productivity gains of the worker at the 90th
 It is also consistent with the estimates without the inclusion of capital of Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull and29
Violante (2000) for the period 1963-1992. See Acemoglu (2002, Table 2, p. 30).
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percentile relative to the worker at the 10  percentile. If the allocation of computers isth
optimal, the most productive worker will get the best computer. In addition, all differences
between workers within one group are addressed to differences in computer use. In all
likelihood there might be other differences between these workers, which will now be
included in the estimate for the proportional productivity gain from using a computer. Hence,
we regard the estimate for the proportional productivity gain to be the close to the upper
bound of the expected productivity gains from computer use.
5.3. Estimation Results
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (12). First we have ran a regression
without taking into account the additional supply created by computer use and the
proportional productivity gains from using a computer. The regression results are reported in
the first column and comparable to the estimates reported by Katz and Murphy (1992) for the
period 1963-1987.  They obtain an estimate for σ of 1.41 for a comparable but different29
definition of skilled and unskilled workers, compared to 1.82 here. The use of weighted series
does not lead to a significantly different estimate (see Appendix A.3 for details about
controlling for changes in the composition of the U.S. labor force). The annual increase in the
demand for skilled labor is about 2.4 percent, which is somewhat lower than the 3.3 percent
obtained by Katz and Murphy (1992). This model is consistent with the explanation that the
increase in the skilled workers’ wages is caused by a slowdown in the growth rate of the
supply of skilled workers since the early 1980s. It should be noted that we are aware of the
serial correlation in the data and we consider the estimates in this section as evidence
 Note that this higher elasticity of substitution is also consistent with the acceleration hypothesis of Acemoglu30
(1998) because an elasticity of substitution larger than 2 requires in the Katz-Murphy model a significant
acceleration in skill-biased technological change to explain the data. However, our model accounts for a higher
elasticity of substitution by a relatively larger supply in terms of efficiency units of skilled workers.
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consistent with our model, reinforcing the argument and do not regard the estimates as clear
evidence.
The second column reports estimates in which the proportional productivity gains are
not allowed to differ from one another, i.e. θ =θ .  In addition, the data used are not weighteds u
for changes in the composition of the U.S. workforce. The estimated proportional productivity
gain for θ =θ  equals 1.15. These estimates suggest that the proportional productivity gains u
from computer use is substantial (15 percent) and lies between approximately 5 and 25
percent. This productivity gain can also be interpreted as the costs of the computer relative to
the wage of the marginal worker who just adopted a computer (i.e., at the break-even point
(equations (3)). This estimate seems reasonable and consistent with the figures about the costs
of computer use relative to the wage shown in Section 3.
The elasticity of substitution from this regression equals 2.52, which is substantially
higher than the estimate from the Katz-Murphy model without the additional supply and
productivity effects. This higher estimate for the elasticity of substitution is consistent with a
larger fraction of skilled workers using the computer compared to unskilled workers. This
effect leads to a relatively larger increase in the supply of skilled workers (in terms of
efficiency units) than in the previous estimates (not including the additional supply), leading
to a higher elasticity of substitution. The time trend for the annual increase in the demand for
skilled labor has dropped from 2.4 percent to 1.4 percent. This fall can be interpreted as the
model accounting for almost 42 percent of the unexplained increase in the demand for skilled
workers.30
 See Acemoglu (2002) for a more detailed discussion of estimating the Krusell-Ohanian-Ríos-Rull-Violante31
model.
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The third column of Table 3 reports estimates allowing for differences in the
productivity gain between skilled and unskilled workers. The point estimate is about 19
percentage points higher for skilled workers compared to unskilled workers: θ  = 1.27 and θ  =s u
1.08. This estimate for skilled workers is substantially higher than the 15 percent productivity
increase found when θ =θ . These estimates seem to suggest that skilled workers gain more ins u
terms of productivity than unskilled workers. However, the margins are rather large and it is
not possible to statistically discriminate between the coefficients for skilled and unskilled
workers. The elasticity of substitution turns out to be relatively high (4.30), but given the
substantial margins, its precise magnitude is not particularly clear from this regression. The
time trend has dropped further to .01. Hence, the model explains more than 60 percent of the
unexplained increase in the demand for skilled workers.
Note that our results are more convincing than the estimates of Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-
Rull and Violante (2000). Their evidence on falling capital equipment prices running wage
inequality is not the variable providing the explanatory power in their model. It turns out that
it is basically the relative supply of skilled workers that runs the results, consistent with the
Katz-Murphy model. Acemoglu (2002) re-estimates the Krusell-Ohanian-Ríos-Rull-Violante
model and finds that the level or the log of the relative price of equipment capital is
insignificant and that the measure performs worse than a linear time trend. In our results, the
additional terms for the proportional productivity gains and additional supply are significant
and do not lead to a lower explanatory power of the model. In addition, we are able to explain
a substantial part of the Katz-Murphy time trend.31
INSERT TABLE 3 OVER HERE
 Weighing the data to control for compositional changes during 1963-2000 gives estimates of θ  = 1.29 and θ32 s u
= 1.47.
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Table 4 reports the results of estimating equations (13) for within-group wage
inequality. The estimation is based on an analysis of the 90 10  percentile of both wageth th
distributions and uses the non-weighted data. The regression equation is set in such a way that
for computer use below 10 percent, within-group wage inequality considered to be constant.
The first column of Table 4 reports an estimate for the proportional productivity gain of using
a computer for skilled workers of θ  = 1.41 with margins between 1.35 and 1.47. This estimates
suggests a productivity gain of around 40 percent from using a computer. The regression
results reported in the second column of Table 4 suggest a similar proportional productivity
gain for unskilled workers, although the confidence interval is somewhat wider: θ  = 1.41u
(1.32, 1.51). These estimates are higher than can be expected from the 21 percent obtained
from the back-of-the-envelope calculation presented in Section 3; also relative to the estimates
for between-group wage inequality these estimates are relatively high.  On the other hand,32
estimates reported by Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002, Table 8, p. 365) are consistent
with such a high estimate for the proportional productivity gain from adopting computers.
They argue that there are large adjustments costs to the successful use of computers, which are
not only due to the installation of computers itself but also to the change in organization
structure, technical assistance and other co-inventions going along with computerization. In
addition, an alternative way to interpret these estimates relative to the between-group
estimates is to consider different vintages of computers. This would lead to productivity gains
of the latest vintage, compared to not using a computer, to be equal to approximately 40
percent of the wage.
To investigate whether these estimates are sensitive to the measure of within-group
-29-
wage inequality, two different definitions also have been tested. First, the 80 20  percentileth th
of the wage distribution has been used as a measure of wage inequality. Now, θ  = 1.21 and θs u
= 1.28. Secondly, the 70 30  percentile of both wage distributions have been investigated.th th
Here,   θ  = 1.15 and θ  = 1.12. These estimates suggest that the proportional productivitys u
gains are lower if within-group wage inequality is allowed to fluctuate after 20 and 30 percent
of the workers within each group have adopted computers.
INSERT TABLE 4 OVER HERE
As argued above, the interpretation of the different estimates for the proportional
productivity gains in Tables 3 and 4 can be viewed upon as lower and upper bound
productivity gains. The relatively low estimate for the productivity gain reported in Table 3
suggests that the additional supply plays an important role and stresses the importance of
analyzing this supply effect separately from the productivity effect. The relatively high
estimates for the productivity gain reported in Table 4 are probably due to by addressing all
within-group differences to computerization. When using a more moderate definition of
within-group wage inequality, the coefficients become lower, suggesting lower productivity
gains more in line with the estimates of between-group wage inequality. 
6. Concluding Remarks
When considering the allocation of computers among groups of workers, it becomes apparent
that those workers who have adopted computers gain from the increased productivity of using
computers. Within the same group, workers who have not adopted computers suffer from an
increased supply of efficiency units of labor. Hence, it is important to distinguish between
individual and group effects of computer adoption to understand the wage dynamics of
computer diffusion. Our model indeed shows that it is important to explicitly consider who
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adopts a computer at what point in time to help understand the effects of computers on the
wage structure. In this way, we are able to explain why the effects of computer adoption are
different in the 1970s than in the 1980s (Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998), why computer use
was already high in the early 1980s without affecting relative wages (Bresnahan, 1999), and
why in the 1990s wage inequality between skilled and unskilled seems to be leveling off (Card
and DiNardo, 2002).
There are two main directions for future research. First, our model shows the
importance of the distinction between individual and group effects (in the sense that groups of
workers produce a similar product) when considering computer adoption. It is therefore very
important to distinguish the right groups. An avenue of further investigation would be to look
more carefully into which groups of workers substitute each other and which groups do not.
Secondly, the model is able to reflect the pattern and timing of wage inequality in the United
States. This is particularly so because of the relatively large initial (i.e., before computers
became around) wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, and the limited way
in which skilled and unskilled workers can be substituted. It would be interesting to analyze
countries in which initial wage inequality would be relatively low and skilled and unskilled
workers are better substitutable. Countries of interest here are continental European countries,
such as France and Germany.
Appendix
A.1. Labor Supply
Labor supply is computed for skilled and unskilled workers. Skilled workers are defined as
workers with at least a completed college education and unskilled workers as workers with
educational levels below a completed college education. We only use workers who reported to
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be employed in the previous year. Full-time workers are weighted with a factor 1, and part-
time workers with the number of hours worked in the preceding week divided by 40 (the
average number of hours worked by the full-time workers). Since the exact number of weeks
worked is not known for several years in the data, full-year workers are weighted with a factor
1 and part-year workers with a factor .5.
Figure A.1 shows the share of skilled workers resulting from this exercise. The figure
shows that the share of skilled workers is steadily increasing from about 15 percent in 1963 to
36 percent in 2000. The slope is steepest in the 1960s and 1970s, which is consistent with the
figures recently presented by Card and Lemieux (2001) for the relative supply of college-
educated workers by different age groups.
INSERT FIGURE A.1 OVER HERE
A.2. Wages
Changes in the U.S. wage structure in the period 1963-2000 are illustrated using data on the
annual earnings of full-time, full-year, wage and salary workers from the March Current
Population Surveys of 1964 to 2001 (covering the earnings in the period from 1963 to 2000).
Full-time, full-year, wage and salary workers are those working at least 35 hours per week and
working at least 40 weeks in the previous calendar year. We only use annual wages between
$1,000 and $900,000.
We use annual earnings for three reasons. The first reason is that computer use is only
available on a yearly basis from the October 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997 School Enrollment
Supplements to the CPS (see A.4 for more details), which only allows for a computation of
break-even wages by year. So, a worker makes an annual decision to adopt a computer for that
year. The second reason is that information on weeks worked and usual weekly hours in the
αα
β
β
 Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) discuss33
several ways in which hours worked can be imputed for the period 1963-1975.
 The data are taken from the Annual Revision of the NIPA made available by the Bureau of Economic34
Analysis. Katz and Murphy (1992) have used the same deflator.
 In the regression analysis we also test whether the results are sensitive to using the 80 , 70 , 20  and 3035 th th th th
percentiles of both wage distributions.
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previous calendar year is available in the March CPS from 1976 onwards. The 1963-1975
period is only covered by bracketed weeks worked information and hours worked last week.
This makes it harder to measure weekly or hourly earnings.  The third reason is that33
computers can be shared among part-time workers, which induces computer use at lower
wage levels as well. While this can be accounted for, the limited information about hours
worked, is likely to bias our estimates.
To avoid measurement problems, part-time and part-year workers are not included
when constructing the wage variable. Only full-time, full-year wages and salaries are used,
which provides information on the gross annual wages. Since the dispersion in productivity
parameters, reflected by wage differentials within the groups of skilled and unskilled workers,
is essential to the model, no correction has been made for demographic factors. To compute
real wages we apply the price deflator for personal consumption expenditures from the
NIPA.  In terms of the model, wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers are of34
interest but within-group wage differentials are also important. The average wages for workers
with productivity  are defined as the 90  percentile of the wage distribution of skilledth
workers and the average wages for workers with productivity  as the 10  percentile of thisth
wage distribution. Similarly, the average wages for workers with productivity  are defined
as the 90  percentile of the unskilled workers’ wage distribution and the average wages forth
workers with productivity  as the 10  percentile of the unskilled workers’ wageth
distribution.  35
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A.3. Changes in the Composition of the U.S. Labor Force
Since the composition of the U.S. labor force changed in the period 1963-2000, an alternative
measure of the wage development has also been used. This alternative measure has been
constructed by defining 32 cells for four age groups, four educational groups and controlling
for gender. These 32 cells have been weighted such that their sizes are equal to the size in
2000. Based on these weights, average and percentile wages have been determined. The age
groups are <29, 30-39, 40-49 and >50, the educational groups are less than highschool,
highschool degree, more than highschool but less than a college degree, and a college degree
or more. Thus, the composition of the workforce and labor supply within the group of skilled
and unskilled workers is equal in all years. The use of more than 32 cells does not
significantly change the regression results, but leads in some instances to rather low numbers
of workers in each cell. The use of less than 32 cells also gives comparable results. 
A.4. Computer Use
Individual computer use has been calculated from the October 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997
School Enrollment Supplements to the CPS as the fraction of currently employed full-time,
year-round workers who answered yes to the question, “Do you use a computer directly at
work?”. The survey defines a computer as a desktop terminal or PC with keyboard and
monitor and does not include an electronic cash register or a hand-held data device. 60,396,
58,401, 59,710, and 52,753 observations were used to calculate these frequencies in 1984,
1989, 1993, and 1997, respectively. We have used full-time, year-round workers only to
compute computer use at work because these workers have also been used to calculate wages
and labor supply (see A.1 and A.2 above). The fractions of skilled workers using computers
were 45.2 percent (1984), 62.8 percent (1989), 70.4 percent (1993), and 76.6 percent (1997).
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The fractions of unskilled workers using computers at work in the same years were 21.6, 33.1,
37.6 and 42.8 percent, respectively. For the sample as a whole, computer use was 28.1, 41.5,
49.4 and 56.1 percent in 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997, respectively.
A.5. Imputing Computer Use
We used the four years from the October 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997 School Enrollment
Supplements to the CPS from which computer use was available to impute computer use in
the other years in the period 1963-2000, using wages from the March CPS.
Consistent with the theory presented in the paper, if computer use equals x, the worker
at (100x)  percentile of the wage distribution is the one who just adopted a computer. Inth
other words, the wage at the (100x)  percentile of the wage distribution is defined as theth
break-even wage for a particular group of workers in a particular year. For example, in 1989
computer use among skilled (unskilled) workers equaled 62.8 (33.1) percent implying that the
break-even wage for skilled workers to adopt a computer is equal to the wage at the 37.2th
(66.9 )  percentile of the skilled (unskilled) workers’ wage distribution. This information isth
available for 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997. The break-even wages in 1992 dollars for skilled
workers are $30,961, $25,956, $24,289, and $20,644, and for unskilled workers $28,606,
$24,112, $23,317, and $20,644, for 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997, respectively.
Using these break-even wages, we can impute computer use and the break-even wage
for each year between 1963 and 2000 by estimating the equation lnw = C + αY + ε, using the
four years for which information is available. In this estimation lnw is the log of the real
annual break-even wage, C is a constant, Y are years dummies, and ε is an error term with the
usual assumptions. For skilled workers this yields the following equation (standard errors in
brackets) for the break-even wage lnw = 8.197 (.187)  0.029 (.002) Y and for unskilled
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workers it equals lnw = 7.539 (.229)  .023 (.003) Y. To generate computer use, all workers
with wages in year Y above the break-even wage are assumed to use a computer at work.
Figure 5 plots this imputed computer use for the period 1963-2000.
A.6. Econometric Specification 
We made assumptions about the distribution of productivity parameters to generate an
analytical solution. To estimate the model, we use the actual distribution of productivity
parameters. 
A.6.1. Between-Group Wage Inequality
In accordance with labor demand equation (2), and allowing for a time trend in wages,
the relative wage in efficiency units equals
(A.1)
Supply of Workers
Empirically, the supply of skilled labor S in efficiency units equals S = S  + S (θ 1)F , wheree e s s
F  denotes the share of efficiency units of skilled workers using a computer. This share equalss
where c are computer users and n non-users. 
a  cannot observed directly, but is derived from the information about wages accordingi
to . In principle, this expression has to be substituted into equation (A.2).
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However, analysis of the data shows that for reasonable values of θ , F  is almost constant ins s
θ . To avoid estimation problems, F  is approximated bys s
(A.2)
which can be understood as the wage-bill share of skilled computer users in the total skilled
workers’ wage-bill.
For unskilled workers, F  is approximated in a similar way. The supply of unskilledu
workers in efficiency units equals U = U  + U (θ 1)F , where F  is the share of unskillede e u u u
workers using a computer:
(A.3)
Efficiency Units of Labor
Wages in terms of efficiency units are not directly observed. We therefore have estimated the
wage ratio of skilled and unskilled workers, the 90 10  percentile wage differential forth th
skilled workers, and the 90 10  percentile wage differential for unskilled workers. The wageth th
of a skilled worker i equals
where  if worker i uses a computer and 0 otherwise. Since
averaging over all skilled workers leads to
where a bar over a variable indicates an average term. Dividing by , rearranging terms
and taking logs then yields
ln
w s
w u
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(A.4)
Substituting equation (A.1) for w , this equation can be estimated by non-linear least squareseu
with θ , θ , γ , and γ  as the unknown parameters. s u 0 1
A.6.2. Within-Group Wage Inequality
Taking into consideration the above derivation for between-group wage inequality, the
90 10  percentile wage differential within the group of skilled workers can be written asth th
where  indicates the years in which the 90  percentile of the wage distribution ofth
skilled workers have adopted a computer. According to the imputed computer use data in
Figure 5, this is in 1974. Dividing this expression by yields the equation for estimating
within-group wage inequality of skilled workers
(A.5)
which has to be estimated by non-linear least squares as well. 
Similarly, the regression equation for the within-group wage inequality of unskilled
workers equals
(A.6)
which is also estimated by non-linear least squares.
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Figure 1
Wage Inequality in the United States
Panel A: ln (90  Percentile Skilled)  ln (10  Percentile Unskilled)th th
Panel B: ln (10  Percentile Skilled)  ln (10  Percentile Unskilled)th th
Panel C: ln (90  Percentile Unskilled)  ln (10  Percentile Unskilled)th th
Note: Data are taken from the March CPS. Skilled workers are college graduates and higher;
unskilled workers are the remaining ones. See the Appendix for further details about the data.
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Figure 2
Log Wage Differentials for Workers in Different Groups Earning the Same Wages in 1963
Note: Data are taken from the March CPS. Skilled workers are college graduates and higher;
unskilled workers are the remaining ones. The comparison of wages is such that the wage of
the skilled workers at the 40  and 50  percentile of the skilled wage distribution correspondsth th
to the wages of the 75.7  and 83.9  percentile of the unskilled wage distribution in 1963.th th
Because the wages do no perfectly match in 1963, the actual ratio, in logarithmic terms, is not
zero in 1963 but a small deviation can be observed from the figure. See the Appendix for
further details about the data.
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Figure 3
Within-Group Wage Inequality over Time
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Figure 4
Between-Group Wage Inequality over Time
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
Skilled
Unskilled
-45-
Figure 5
Imputed Shares of Skilled and Unskilled Workers Using Computers in the United States
Note: All data are taken from the October and March CPS from 1964 to 2001. The imputed
series for computer use are estimated using the October series on computer use and real wages
to estimate a wage equation for the years in which computer use is available. This equation is
used to impute computer use in the March series from 1964 to 2001. See the Appendix (A.4
and A.5) for more details.
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Figure A.1
Share of Skilled Workers in Total Labor Supply
Note: Data are taken from the March CPS. Skilled workers are college graduates and higher;
unskilled workers are the remaining ones. See the Appendix (A.1) for further details about the
data.
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Table 1
Relative Wages in Efficiency Units in Each of the Five Stages
Stage Relative wages in efficiency units
No computer use
The most productive skilled workers use computers
Both types of workers use computers
All skilled and some unskilled workers use computers
All workers use computers
βa1
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Table 2
Individual Workers’ Wages at Different Stages of Computer Diffusion Relative to Worker j with Productivity
Stage Wage for Worker 1 with Productivity Parameter a Wage for Worker 2 with Productivity Parameter a1 2
1
2a
2b
3a
3b
1
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6
Note: Computer adoption is assumed to occur in the following order:  and . Stage 1: No computer use; Stage
2a: The most productive skilled worker adopts a computer; Stage 2b: Worker 1 adopts a computer; Stage 3a: The most productive unskilled
worker adopts a computer; Stage 3b: Worker 2 adopts a computer; Stage 4: All skilled workers have adopted a computer; and Stage 5: All
workers have adopted computers (but the costs of using a computer V might still be positive). Stage 6: V=0. 
Table 3
Estimates for Between-Group Wage Inequality
No Proportional Productivity Gains and Equal Proportional Productivity Gains Different Proportional Productivity Gains
Supply Effects
95% confidence 95% confidence 95% confidence
Interval Interval interval
Estimate Standard Lower Upper Estimate Standard Lower Upper Estimate Standard Lower Upper
Error Error Error
θ 1.150 .045 1.058 1.242
θ 1.272 .071 1.128 1.416s
θ 1.079 .058 .961 1.197u
σ 1.821 .105 1.312 2.976 2.517 .556 1.388 3.646 4.298 1.837 .560 8.037
γ .024 .004 .015 .032 .014 .004 .005 .022 .009 .004 .001 .0171
γ .299 .127 .042 .557 .585 .264 .048 1.1210
R .893 .885 .9122
Note: All data are taken from the 1964-2001 March CPS files. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the average wages of skilled and
unskilled workers. Computer use is imputed using the October Supplements to the 1984, 1989, 1993 and 1997 CPS files. See the Appendix for
further details about the data. The regressions are performed by non-linear least squares. See the Econometric Specification in the Appendix (A.6)
for further details.
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Table 4
Estimates for Within-Group Wage Inequality
Skilled workers Unskilled workers
95% confidence 95% confidence
interval interval
Estimate Standard Lower Upper Estimate Standard Lower Upper
Error Error
θ 1.413 .029 1.354 1.472s
θ 1.412 .047 1.317 1.507u
γ 3.524 .030 3.463 3.584 3.634 .033 3.568 3.7000
R .883 .7512
Note: All data are taken from the 1964-2001 March CPS files. The dependent variable  is the
log of the 90 10  percentile wage differential within both groups. Computer use is imputedth th
using the October Supplements to the 1984, 1989, 1993 and 1997 CPS files. See the
Appendix for further details about the data. The regressions are performed by non-linear least
squares. See the Econometric Specification in the Appendix (A.6) for further details.
